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THE GROWING DEBATE ON MEDICAL MARIJUANA:
FEDERAL POWER VS. STATES RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Seventy-year old Bob lives with his wife Jane in San Diego, California.'
Ten years ago, Bob was diagnosed with lung cancer and he must undergo
chemotherapy for treatment.2 Although the chemotherapy fights the cancer,
it also causes many unpleasant side effects, including nausea and vomiting.3
As a result, Bob must take more medications to fight off the numerous side
effects caused by the necessary treatment. For many years, Bob took Zofran
to help his nausea and vomiting. Zofran must be administered intravenously,
it is expensive and it alleviates symptoms in only fifty-six percent of cases.4
In 1996, however, California passed Proposition 215 (titled the Compassion-
ate Use Act) by popular initiative.5 The Compassionate Use Act permits se-
riously ill Californians to obtain and use marijuana for medicinal purposes,
and allows the patient or the primary caretaker to cultivate the plant.6 Mari-
juana is inexpensive and eliminates some of the most painful side effects of
chemotherapy in almost eighty percent of cases.7 Like many seriously ill pa-
tients, Bob chooses to smoke marijuana to deal with his disease and its ac-
companying discomfort and pain, and his primary caretaker, Jane, cultivates
the plant. After Bob smokes the marijuana plant, his nausea and vomiting
subside or even cease. Because California voters decided to distinguish be-
tween recreational and medical uses of marijuana when they passed Proposi-
tion 215, Bob will not be prosecuted for using this illegal substance and Jane
will not be prosecuted by the State of California for cultivating the plant.
However, federal law does not make such a distinction. As a result, the At-
1. The following is based on a hypothetical.
2. Chemotherapy is administered intravenously every few weeks and is considered to be
the most important treatment for cancer; however, the agents used in the treatment are
"among the most powerful and toxic chemicals used in medicine." LESTER GRINSPOON &
JAMES B. BAKALAR., MARIJUANA THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 23 (1997).
3. Other, more severe, side effects include deafness, life-threatening kidney failure,
bleeding, bruising, suppressing the immune system, destroying the heart muscle, eating away
of skin or tissue, hair loss, and a second type of cancer. See id. at 23-24.
4. See id. at 24-25.
5. See National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws [hereinafter NORML],
Medical Marijuana: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.norml.org/medical/ faq.shtml
(last visited Nov. 4, 2000).
6. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2000).
7. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 25.
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torney General of the United States intends to prosecute Jane for cultivating
the marijuana plant and Bob for smoking it. Under the Federal Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the Controlled Sub-
stances Act),' marijuana may not be cultivated or smoked for any purpose.
Congress, claiming authority from the Commerce Clause, established a regu-
latory scheme in the Controlled Substances Act. Controlled substances are
placed in one of five "Schedules" depending on each substance's potential
for abuse, the extent to which each may lead to psychological or physical
dependence, and whether each has a currently accepted medical use in the
United States.9 The obvious conflict between these two regulatory schemes
leads to an inevitable clash and a question of significant federalist propor-
tions: Does the Federal Government have the power to override a state initia-
tive passed by a majority of California citizens?
This year alone, an estimated 552,200 Americans will die of cancer and
1,220,100 more Americans will be diagnosed with cancer. Numerous bouts
of vomiting and nausea following treatment are the most common side ef-
fects associated with chemotherapy." Moreover, by the end of June 2000,
753,907 people were reported to be suffering from AIDS 2 and 113,167 peo-
ple were reported to be living with HIV in the United States. 3 AIDS wasting
8. A federal law prohibiting cultivation and possession of manjuana for any purpose. 21
U.S.C. § 812 (West 2000).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (2000). Drugs classified in Schedule I are considered to have a
high potential for abuse, have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States, and there is a lack of accepted safety for their use under medical supervision. Physi-
cians are prohibited from prescribing Schedule I drugs. Physicians are permitted to prescribe
drugs from Schedules II through V. Drugs classified in Schedule II are considered to also
have a high potential for abuse, but they are considered to have a currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restric-
tions, and abuse of the drug or other substances may lead to severe psychological or physical
dependence. Drugs classified in Schedule III are considered to have a potential for abuse less
than the drugs or other substances in schedules I and II, they have a currently accepted medi-
cal use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to
moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. Drugs classified in
Schedule IV are considered to have a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or other
substances in schedule III, they have a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States, and abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical depend-
ence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.
Finally, drugs classified in schedule V are considered to have a low potential for abuse rela-
tive to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV, they have a currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to
limited physical dependence or psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other sub-
stances in schedule IV. See generally id.
10. American Cancer Society: Statistics, at http://www.cancer.org/cancerinfo/sitecenter
(last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
11. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 24.
12. Center for Disease Control, Divisions Of HIVAIDS Prevention, at
http:llwww.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/cumulati.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
13. Id.
2000] 370
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syndrome,"' nausea, and vomiting are commonly associated with the dis-
ease. 5 Marijuana is widely considered to be an extremely effective medicine
to assist with those common side effects associated with cancer, chemother-
apy, and AIDS.'6 Marijuana also helps ease some of the suffering associated
with ailments such as glaucoma, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, paraplegia,
quadriplegia, and chronic pain. " Yet, the federal government has placed
marijuana in Schedule I with drugs having no medical benefits such as LSD
and heroine. Consequently, under federal law physicians cannot prescribe
marijuana." Instead, patients are prescribed pharmaceutical drugs such as
Zofran, which costs hundreds of dollars more, and must be administered in-
travenously. 9 Morphine and cocaine may be prescribed under the Controlled
Substances Act, although both may be habit forming and have a potential for
fatal overdose." Despite the lack of harmful effects associated with mari-
juana, federal law prohibits the medical use of marijuana, a substance that
has been around for more than five thousand years.
Organizations such as the National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML) and the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics
(ACT) have been trying to reschedule marijuana from a Schedule I drug to a
Schedule II drug for years, but Congress refuses to take action.' Even one of
the Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA)22 own administrative law judges,
Francis L. Young, said, "It would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious
for DEA to continue to stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this
substance.'" In conclusion, Judge Young recommended the Administrator to
14. This syndrome is defined as a ten percent loss of body weight or more for unknown
reasons. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 102.
15. See id. at 103.
16. See id. There are only two drugs permitted by the Federal Drug Administration to
treat the AIDS wasting syndrome, but most victims of this syndrome prefer to smoke mari-
juana, as the side effects for the two permitted drugs are unpleasant. See id. at 102-03. A pa-
tient living with AIDS said smoking marijuana makes her feel "as if I am living with AIDS
rather than just existing. My appetite returns, and once I have eaten, I don't feel sick any-
more." Id. at 104.Another physician patient said, "I felt better than at any time since I had
been diagnosed.. .I felt truly alive once again." Id. at 106-07.
17. See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2.
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (West 2000).
19. GRiNsPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 24-25.
20. PHYSICLANS DaSK RERENCE 594, 607-608 (2000).
21. See generally Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement
Agency, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug
Enforcement Agency & Dep't of Health Educ. & Welfare, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
22. The DEA has the authority from the Attorney General to reschedule marijuana. See
Drug Enforcement Agency, Controlled Substances Act, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dealagencyl
csa.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2000).
23. CANNABIS IN MEDICAL PRACTICE: A LEGAL, HISTORICAL AND PHARMACOLOGICAL
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transfer marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule 11, thereby making it avail-
able for prescription. ' Judge Young's recommendation was ignored by the
Administrator, and marijuana was not rescheduled.' Consequently, citizens
of various states have reclassified marijuana using the initiative process."
The federal government, through the Controlled Substances Act, denies
terminally ill patients an inexpensive and effective treatment for their ail-
ments. Congress argues that marijuana affects interstate commerce, and thus
Congress can regulate its use and production through its power under the
Commerce Clause. In two recent Supreme Court decisions, however, the
Court has said Congress has the power to regulate only those economic ac-
tivities having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
28
This Comment argues that the federal government has exceeded its au-
thority under the Commerce Clause by regulating a non-economic activity.29
Those who cultivate and use marijuana for medical purposes are not affect-
ing interstate commerce. Medical marijuana is locally grown, is not sold, nor
is the marijuana permitted to be transported across state lines. Part II dis-
cusses the federalization of crime through the use of the Commerce Clause
and associated problems. Part I lays out the history of medical marijuana.
Part IV considers the current debate between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment with regard to the issue of medical marijuana. Part V reviews the
fundamental constitutional principle of federalism30 and whether the Federal
Controlled Substances Act can preempt the California Compassionate Use
Act and other state laws permitting marijuana to be used for medicinal pur-
poses. Part VI examines federal authority under the Commerce Clause prior
to 1995. Part VII explores federal authority under the Commerce Clause af-
ter 1995, and argues that in light of the principles established by the Su-
OvERvIEw OF THE THERAPEuTIc USE OF MARIJUANA 51-52 (1997).
24. See id. at 52.
25. See id.
26. Arizona and California voters approved medical marijuana laws in 1996. See
NORML, Medical Marijuana: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.norml.org/medicall
faq.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2000). Voters in Alaska, Oregon and Washington approved
similar laws in 1998. See id. Although the District of Columbia voters approved an initiative
in 1998 with 69 percent of the vote, Congress overrode the law. See id. Voters in Maine ap-
proved their own medical marijuana law in 1999,and the Hawaii State Senate approved a bill
that protects seriously ill patients who use marijuana medically from local and state criminal
prosecution., which, on June 14, 2000, was signed into law by Hawaii's Governor Ben
Cayetano. See id. On November 7, 2000, Nevada and Colorado citizens also passed similar
marijuana initiatives. See NORML, Medical Marijuana Initiatives Pass In Colorado and
Nevada; Californians Pass Initiative To Keep Non-Violent Drug Offenders Out Of Jail, at
http://www.norml.org/news/ archives/00-11-09.shtml (last visited Nov. 29, 2000).
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (2000).
28. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
29. See id.
30. Federalism is defined as the division of power between the federal government and
state governments. RAOuL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 3 (1987).
2000]
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/5
THE GROWING DEBATE ON MEDICAL MARIJUANA
preme Court in United States v. Lopez3i ' and United States v. Morrison,32 it
would appear that Congress has exceeded its enumerated powers in regulat-
ing the medical use of locally grown marijuana. This Comment concludes by
addressing how marijuana can be used legally for medical purposes without
affecting the overall regulatory scheme.
IE. FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Even though the "police power" is one that has been traditionally left to
the states, in the last quarter of the twentieth century the federalization of
crime has increased tremendously as a response to public concern surround-
ing a variety of issues.33 Federalization of crime is leading us down a path
where we are developing a federal police power, a power the framers never
intended, and one which they repeatedly granted to the States.' Public con-
cern in the 1960's about organized crime, drugs, violence, and other societal
ills gave rise to federal legislation in matters involving local conduct, which
had been previously left to the States.' Between 1995 and 1998, there was a
thirty percent increase in criminal case filings.36 In 1998 alone, there was a
fifteen-percent increase in criminal case filings at the federal level and in
1999 there was another four- percent jump.37 The federalization of crime is a
response to highly publicized events rather than genuine need." By passing
such legislation, Congress seeks to attain popularity with its constituents,
appearing as though it is solving problems.39 In spite of this, the federaliza-
tion of crime "causes serious problems to the administration of justice in this
country." Federalization upsets the balance between the state and federal
31. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
32. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
33. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 979 (1995)
34. James Madison in Federalist No. 45 wrote,
The powers delegated in the proposed constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numer-
ous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects as
war, peace, negotiations and foreign commerce. . . The powers reserved to the
States will extend to all objects which, in the course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and
prosperity of the State.
BERGER, supra note 30, at 71-72.
35. See James A. Strazzella, Task Force on Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998
A.B.A. SBc. CRIM. JUST. REP. 7.
36. See 1999 ADMIN. OFF. OFTHEU.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 15.
37. Id.
38. See Strazzella, supra note 35, at 14-15.
39. See id. at 17.
40. Strazzella, supra note 35, at 50; Beale, supra note 33, at 985-88.
20001
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system created by the Constitution; it has an adverse impact on the federal
judicial system; and it creates different results for defendants who have
committed the same crime."'
Considering criminal cases require more judicial resources, are often
complex, and are accorded top priority by the Speedy Trial Act,42 a dispro-
portionate amount of federal resources are consumed by criminal cases, re-
sulting in fewer resources for civil trials. '3 Federal laws often overlap with
state laws, as is the case with the Controlled Substance Act.' As a result, an
offender selected to be federally prosecuted will be subjected to a much
harsher penalty than another prosecuted under the parallel state law.45
The Controlled Substances Act is an example of the federalization of
crime. Under the Act, Congress makes it unlawful for any person to know-
ingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with in-
tent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.' Despite
new evidence, the federal government has refused to reclassify marijuana,
instead continuing to classify it in the same category with heroin and LSD.
Marijuana has been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning
marijuana is alleged to have a "high potential for abuse," "no currently ac-
cepted medical use in treatment in the United States," and "a lack of ac-
cepted safety for use of the drug or substance under medical supervision.' ""
Consequently, because marijuana is a Schedule I drug, doctors cannot dis-
pense marijuana to any patient outside of a strictly controlled research pro-
ject that has been registered with the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)." On the
other hand, physicians may lawfully distribute controlled substances placed
in Schedules II through V.49 Congress grants the Attorney General the power
to determine whether or not marijuana should be rescheduled to Schedule II,
which would allow the substance to be prescribed to those in need.-' Since
41. See Strazzella, supra note 35, at 50.
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (West 1985) (stating that if a trial does not occur within sev-
enty days, the charge will be dismissed).
43. See Beale, supra note 33, at 985-88.
44. Id. at 997.
45. Id.
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (West 2000).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (West 2000).
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (West 2000).
49. Id.
50. The Attorney General may by rule:
(1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug or other
substance if he-(A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for
abuse, and (B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings
prescribed by subsection (b) of section 812 of this title for the schedule in which
such drug is to be placed; or (2) remove any drug or other substance from the
schedules if he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the require-
20001
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1972 the National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML),
the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics (ACT), and other groups have been
petitioning the courts for hearings to reschedule marijuana, but all attempts
have failed.'
Limiting federal jurisdiction over drug related offenses would ease the
burden on federal courts. Prosecutors would be able to focus on more press-
ing issues, and the penalties for drug offenses would be more equal.' Thus,
by federalizing more and more crimes, we seem to be losing the fundamental
principle of federalism.
Ill. THE HISTORY OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA
Evidence suggests marijuana was used five thousand years ago under
the reign of the Chinese Emperor Chen Nung 3 People used it for a variety
of reasons, including treating malaria, inducing sleep, stimulating appetite,
and relieving headaches.' In the West, marijuana was not introduced as a
medicine until the mid-nineteenth century W.B. O'Shaughnessy was the
first Western physician to research and document the medical benefits of
ments for inclusion in any schedule. Rules of the Attorney General under this sub-
section shall be made on the record after opportunity for a hearing pursuant to the
rulemaking procedures prescribed by subchapter H of chapter 5 of title 5. Proceed-
ings for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of such rules may be initiated by the
Attorney General (1) on his own motion, (2) at the request of the Secretary, or (3)
on the petition of any interested party. The Attorney General shall, before initiating
proceedings request from the Secretary a scientific and medical evaluation, and his
recommendations, as to whether such drug or other substance should be so con-
trolled or removed as a controlled substance. In making such evaluation and rec-
ommendations, the Secretary shall consider the following factors (1) Its actual or
relative potential for abuse; (2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if
known; (3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance; (4) Its history and current pattern of abuse; (5) The scope, duration, and
significance of abuse; (6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health; (7) Its
psychic or physiological dependence liability; and (8) Whether the substance is an
immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under this subchapter. The
recommendations of the Secretary shall include recommendations with respect to
the appropriate schedule, if any, under which such drug or other substance should
be listed. The evaluation and the recommendations of the Secretary shall be made
in writing and submitted to the Attorney General within a reasonable time. The
recommendations of the Secretary to the Attorney General shall be binding on the
Attorney General as to such scientific and medical matters, and if the Secretary
recommends that a drug or other substance not be controlled, the Attorney General
shall not control the drug or other substance.
21 U.S.C. § 811 (West 2000).
51. See generally cases cited supra note 21.
52. See generally Strazzella, supra note 35.
53. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 3.
54. kd
55. Id. at 4.
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marijuana.56 Soon thereafter, doctors in both England and the United States
were prescribing marijuana to their patients.' As a response, the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics under Harry Ansliger organized a campaign, portraying
marijuana users as-violent, crazed criminals.58 This campaign against mari-
juana lead to the enactment of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937." Marijuana
was taxed at one dollar per ounce regardless of whether it was used for rec-
reational or medicinal purposes.' Although the original purpose of the Mari-
juana Tax Act was to deter recreational drug use, it led to much more.6'
As recreational use increased in the 1960s, Congress reacted by passing
the Controlled Substances Act in 1970.62 As previously stated, marijuana is
placed in the most restrictive category and classified as having no medicinal
benefits, which consequently does not allow doctors to prescribe the medica-
tion to their patients. 3 Morphine and cocaine, however, are placed into
Schedule II, even though the risk of addiction and fatal overdoses is much
greater.' A synthetic opium-based painkiller, made by Winthrop Pharmaceu-
ticals, was rescheduled to Schedule IV even though testimony indicated
hundreds of cases of addiction, a number of overdose deaths, and much evi-
dence of abuse.' Attempts began to reschedule marijuana as a Schedule II
drug so it could be legally prescribed.' Hearings were held before the Bu-
reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.67 Even though marijuana is not ad-
dictive or lethal, the government refuses to transfer marijuana to Schedule
1168
Notwithstanding the federal government's legitimate concern in regulat-
ing the use of marijuana, the law should distinguish between recreational and
medicinal use. The Controlled Substances Act has been able to distinguish
between the medical and recreational use of morphine and cocaine without
encountering any serious enforcement problems. There is a legitimate
56. kAl
57. Id.
58. Id. at 7-8.
59. Id.
60. ld. at 8.
61. For example, research on the medicinal effects of marijuana became nearly impossi-
ble. See Matthew Segal, Overdue Process: Why Denial of Physician-Prescribed Marijuana to
Terminally Ill Patients Violates the United States Constitution, 22 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 235,
240 (1998). By 1941 marijuana was removed from the United States Pharmacopoeia and Na-
tional Formulary. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 8.
62. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 13.
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 812.
64. See id.
65. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 14.
66. See generally cases cited supra note 21.
67. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 2, at 13.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Morphine and cocaine are a few such examples.
20001
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/5
THE GROWING DEBATE ON MEDICAL MARIJUANA
health interest in smoking marijuana that must be recognized for persons
suffering from AIDS, cancer, multiple sclerosis, glaucoma, and other serious
illnesses, who need to use the substance to help alleviate some of their ail-
ments." Accordingly, there should be a distinction made between those in
need of the medication, and those solely using it for recreational purposes, as
there is for other controlled substances."
The federal government argues it does not want to send the wrong mes-
sage to America's youth by legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes,
However, under initiatives passed in California and other states allowing
marijuana use for medicinal purposes, persons engaged in recreational use or
sales would still be subject to criminal penalties.73 Hence, the only message
being sent to America's youth is a that medical patient has access to all
available medications, including marijuana. Furthermore, the federal gov-
ernment claims that allowing marijuana for medicinal use would increase the
availability, and thus increase the risks of widespread drug use.74 According
to the aforementioned state initiatives, a person in need of marijuana could
only obtain the amount prescribed by their physician. Individuals who pos-
sess or cultivate marijuana for other purposes would still be prosecuted.75
Accordingly, it would not increase the amount on the streets because it
would not be sold on the streets. If anything, such initiatives would reduce
the amount on the streets as medical patients could legally obtain the medi-
cation, and not be forced to turn to the illegal drug markets.
IV. THE GROWING DEBATE
On November 5, 1996, California residents voted to decriminalize mari-
juana for medicinal purposes by passing Proposition 215, entitled the Com-
passionate Use Act.76 Under this Act, the people of the State of California
declared the purpose of the Act was:
70. See Introduction, and accompanying text.
71. Those who have a medical need will be permitted to use the substance with a pre-
scription; those who do not have such a need will be prosecuted for possession of a controlled
substance.
72. See Laura M. Rojas, California's Compassionate Use Act and the Federal Govern-
ment's Medical Marijuana Policy: Can California Physicians Recommend Marijuana to
Their Patients Without Subjecting Themselves to Sanctions? 30 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1373,
1390 (1999).
73. The Compassionate Use Act in California provides that nothing in the section "shall
be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that en-
dangers others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(2) (West 2000).
74. See Rojas, supra note 72, at 1390.
75. See Andrew J. LeVay, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REv. 699, 711 (2000).
76. California State Proposition 215.
20001
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To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appro-
priate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that
the person's health, would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treat-
ment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthri-
tis, migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief."
Soon after this proposition was passed, non-profit cannabis78 dispensa-
ries began to form throughout the state, providing marijuana to seriously ill
patients upon a doctor's recommendation." Unfortunately, under the Federal
Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or inten-
tionally to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
The federal government, unable to revoke doctors' licenses to prescribe
controlled substances if the doctor prescribes marijuana,8 and unwilling to
accept the decisions of California citizens, filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction against medical cannabis dispensaries that were providing mari-
juana to seriously ill patients.82 On May 13, 1998 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the United States' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction.83 Shortly thereafter, the Court granted
members of the Oakland, Matin and Ukiah medical cannabis cooperatives
motion to intervene.' The United States filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint-in-intervention and the District Court granted the motion." Emphati-
cally, on September 13, 1999, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the motion and remanded it back to the District Court." The
Ninth Circuit held:
The government ... has yet to identify any interest it may have in block-
ing the distribution of cannabis to those with medical needs, relying exclu-
sively on its general interest in enforcing its statutes. It has offered no evi-
dence to rebut OCBC's [Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative] evi-
dence that cannabis is the only effective treatment for a large group of se-
riously ill individuals, and it confirmed at oral argument that it sees no
need to offer any. It simply rests on the erroneous argument that the dis-
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2000).
78. Cannabis is part of the scientific name for the marijuana plant, and often used to refer
to marijuana.
79. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
80. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (West 2000).
81. See Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174, 1 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding the Con-
trolled Substances Act does not permit the government to revoke a physician's license to dis-
pense controlled substances merely because the physician "recommends" marijuana to a pa-
tient).
82. See Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. at 1088.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 1999 WL 111893.
85. Id.
86. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9 Cir. 1999).
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trict judge was compelled as a matter of law to issue an injunction that is
coextensive with the facial scope of the statute."
On remand, the District Court merely modified the injunction; it did not
dismiss it. The District Court held the injunction did not apply to the distri-
bution of cannabis by the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative to patients
who:
(1) suffer from a serious medical condition, (2) will suffer imminent harm
if the patient-member does not have access to cannabis, (3) need cannabis
for the treatment of the patient-member's medical condition, or need can-
nabis to alleviate the medical condition or symptoms associated with the
medical condition, and (4) have no reasonable legal alternative to cannabis
for the effective treatment or alleviation of the patient-member's legal
medical condition or symptoms associated with the medical condition be-
cause the patient-member has tried all other legal alternatives to cannabis
and the alternatives have been ineffective in treating or alleviating the pa-
tient- member's medical condition or symptoms associated with the medi-
cal condition, or the alternatives result in side effects which the patient-
member cannot reasonably tolerate.8
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the United States subsequently filed both a
petition for certiorari and an application for stay with the United States Su-
preme Court. On August 29, 2000 the United States Supreme Court granted
the application for stay, prohibiting dispensaries in California from distribut-
ing marijuana to those persons in need until "[flinal disposition of the appeal
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and further order
of the court."" More importantly, on November 27, 2000 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether the Controlled Sub-
stances Act bars a medical necessity defense to the Act's prohibition against
manufacturing and distributing marijuana.' If the Supreme Court follows
87. Id. at 1115.
88. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., et al., 2000 WL 1517166 (2000).
89. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 121 S. Ct. 21 (2000). Justice Ste-
vens dissented stating:
Because the applicant in this case has failed to demonstrate that the denial of nec-
essary medicine to seriously ill and dying patients will advance the public interest
or that the failure to enjoin the distribution of such medicine will impair the or-
derly enforcement of federal criminal statutes, whereas respondents have demon-
strated that the entry of a stay will cause them irreparable harm, I am persuaded
that a fair assessment of that balance favors a denial of the extraordinary relief that
the government seeks.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. NORML, at http://www.norml.org./news/archives00-1 1-28.shtml (last visited Nov.
29, 2000). Oral arguments on this case were heard by the Supreme Court on March 28, 2001.
See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 2001 WL 300618. On May 14,
2001, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and held there is no medical
necessity defense available to the Buyers' Cooperative to the Controlled Substances Act;
however, the Court declined to address any Constitutional issues, finding that that they were
not presented at the Court of Appeals. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop-
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their decisions in Lopez and Morrison, they should hold that the Controlled
Substances Act does not bar a medical necessity defense because the Com-
merce Clause does not grant Congress the authority to do so.
V. FEDERALISM
In order to secure individual liberty and prevent tyranny, "the Constitu-
tion divides authority between federal and state governments for the protec-
tion of individuals."' Not wanting an all-powerful centralized government
and wishing to maintain state sovereignty, the Constitution declares the Fed-
eral government to be one of enumerated powers.' Consequently, when
Congress wishes to act, it must articulate from which article in the Constitu-
tion it derives its authority to act. Powers not entrusted to the Federal Gov-
ernment are placed in the hands of the states through the Tenth Amend-
ment?3 Realizing conflicts could arise between federal and state laws, Article
VI declares the Constitution the supreme law of the land.9 As a result, a con-
stitutionally valid federal law preempts any state law in conflict with an es-
tablished federal law."
The issue of federal power verses states rights has resurfaced with the
passage of initiatives allowing medical use of marijuana. In direct conflict
with the Controlled Substances Act, nine states have laws declaring that per-
sons with a medical need to smoke marijuana will not be prosecuted for pos-
session or cultivation of the substance.96 Mere conflict between state law
with the federal law, however, does not mean that the state law is preempted.
From the perspective of past Supreme Court rulings, the Controlled Sub-
stances Act may very well be unconstitutional. It exceeds the authority
granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause because it is not regulating
the use of channels for interstate commerce, it is not regulating and protect-
ing the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, nor the persons or things in
interstate commerce, and it is not regulating activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce.97 If the founding fathers wanted all fifty states to be the
erative, 2001 WL 501567.
91. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
93. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
X.
94. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 ('Tis Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.").
95. See id. ('This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
96. See NORML, supra note 26, and accompanying text.
97. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
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same and abide by the same laws, they would not have created the idea of
federalism. All states are affected differently by marijuana use, and there
needs to be a place for experimentation on whether legalizing it for medical
patients will work. Wyoming, for example, does not necessarily need to have
a law allowing marijuana for medicinal purposes as only one out of every
100,000 persons in Wyoming suffers from AIDS." For California, however,
it is necessary because almost twenty out of every 100,000 persons suffer
from AIDS." Given the diversity in the needs of citizens of different states,
the regulation of marijuana is best left as a matter of local determination.
Moreover, because possession and local cultivation of marijuana is not an
economic activity, Congress does not have the power to regulate it under the
Commerce Clause.
According to the framers, the internal functions of the nation were to be
maintained by the States."® Thus, they did not grant the federal government a
national police power; instead, the "police power"" 2 was to be retained by
the States."n Nevertheless, even without an express grant of "police power,"
Congress passes criminal laws relying on the Commerce Clause for author-
ity," and the Controlled Substances Act is an example of such a law. Con-
gress claims that because it has the power to regulate interstate commerce, it
has the power to regulate marijuana use and possession because of the
amount of drugs flowing through interstate commerce." Although drug traf-
ficking is of national concern, federal legislation controlling drug use and
possession casts aside the intent of the framers and the fundamental idea of
federalism." Federal laws controlling drug trafficking having interstate or
international characteristics can be viewed as being more effective than state
laws because of the priority drug enforcement receives at the federal level,
the degree of enforcement efforts, and the amount of resources at the federal
98. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD, and
TB Prevention, Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, 1998 special data run.
99. See id.
100. BERGER, supra note 30, at 131.
101. The Supreme Court has recognized a de facto police power to prohibit the interstate
shipment of things. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding Congress could
prohibit the shipment of lottery tickets from state to state under its Commerce Clause power);
Hoke v. U.S., 227 U.S. 308, 323 (1913) (holding Congress could prohibit the transportation of
women for immoral purposes). See also Brooks v. U.S., 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (holding Con-
gress could ban the interstate transportation of stolen autos).
102. The powers that the states were to retain encompassed the protection of health,
safety, and morals of its citizens. See BRGER, supra note 30, at 140.
103. See id. at 140; Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of
American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138 (1995).
104. See Anna Johnson Cramer, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: A Histori-
cal and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REv. 271, 272 (2000);
Brickey, supra note 103, at 1142.
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (West 2000).
106. See Cramer, supra note 104, at 292.
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level."°n Conversely, these laws are not effective at the local level when deal-
ing with small drug cases,' as they merely burden the courts with matters
that could be effectively managed by state courts.
Congress has exceeded the power given to it under the Commerce
Clause, and when the legislature goes beyond its enumerated powers, the
judiciary must act to limit it."° Although prior to 1995 the Supreme Court
did not invalidate a single piece of legislation regulating private activity as
exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, the Court in
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison acknowledged definite
.boundaries as to the reach of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
Congress cannot regulate activities that are not commercial in nature, even if
it provides a substantial amount of legislative findings claiming the affect of
the local activity on interstate commerce." ' Consequently, after the Supreme
Court decisions in Lopez and Morrison, the Controlled Substances Act in its
attempt to control medical marijuana is not a valid exercise of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause because the medical use of marijuana is
not an economic activity. It is a health measure passed by some states allow-
ing its citizens access to viable health benefits. Health laws are distinct from
laws regulating commerce, because they are a "police power" and as such a
purely internal matter."'
Additionally, "'States possess primary authority for defining and enforc-
ing the criminal law' ... [and] [w]hen Congress criminalizes conduct al-
ready denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a 'change in the sensi-
tive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.""' 2 In the instant
case, California has a law criminalizing persons who possess and cultivate
marijuana. "' The ballot initiative passed in California merely creates an ex-
107. See Brickey, supra note 103, at 1159.
108. Id.
109. 'The federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us [the judiciary] to admit inability to intervene when
one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far." United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
110. See generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
111. See BERGER, supra note 30, at 140.
112. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3.
113. See Cal. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2000):
Except as authorized by law, every person who possesses any concentrated canna-
bis shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more
than one year or by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500), or by both
such fine and imprisonment, or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state
prison.
See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (West 2000) ("Every person who plants,
cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes any marijuana or any part thereof, except as otherwise
provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison.").
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ception to the existing state law regarding the use, possession, and sale of
marijuana. Allowing the federal government to prohibit states from making
their own criminal laws is a violation of the fundamental principle of feder-
alism created by the Constitution.
VI. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
PRE LOPEZ AND MORRISON
The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the power to
regulate Commerce among the several States."' The Commerce Clause
serves as both a source of and a limit on congressional authority."5 The Su-
preme Court's first interpretation of Congress's commerce power came in
the case of Gibbons v. Ogden,"' where Chief Justice Marshall observed that
commerce "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed.." In the very same instance, the court in Gib-
bons also discussed the limitations on Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause. The court held Congress' commerce power does not extend to
"commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man
and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which
does not extend to or affect other States." "' The court said, "[s]uch a power
would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.""' 9 Although Congress'
authority under the Commerce Clause has changed throughout history, the
court recognized early on that the commerce power is not absolute.
From the time Gibbons was decided until 1887 when the Interstate
Commerce Act was enacted, the Supreme Court was rarely involved with
Commerce Clause litigation. 2 However, from 1887 to 1937, the Supreme
Court began to consider the limits of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause, and distinguished "commerce" between the states from other
economic activities, such as "mining," "manufacturing," and "production.' 2'
In 1937, the attitude of the Supreme Court drastically changed in the case of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., where the Court held Congress
could regulate any activity having a "close and substantial relationship" with
interstate commerce.' But even there, the Court recognized limits to Con-
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
115. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, 807-08 (3d ed.
2000).
116. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
117. Id. at 196.
118. ldL at 195.
119. Id.
120. See TRIBE, supra note 115, at 808.
121. Id. at 810.
122. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
123. See id. at 41.
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gress' authority, explaining that Congress could not extend its authority un-
der the Commerce Clause when the effects on interstate commerce are "so
indirect and remote that... [it] would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create a completely central-
ized government." 2 " Nevertheless, from 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court
did not invalidate any Congressional regulations of private activity as ex-
ceeding the authority granted to it under the Commerce Clause. 25
VII. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE:
POST LOPEZ AND MORRISON
The Supreme Court has begun to realize that Congress is stretching its
power under the Commerce Clause too far. Accordingly, the question of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause has split the justices of the
Supreme Court as they attempt to draw a line between what can and cannot
be regulated. 26 The Commerce Clause, as limited by the Lopez and Morrison
decisions, only permits Congress to regulate those activities that are eco-
nomic in nature. Permitting Congress to regulate everything affecting inter-
state commerce provides no limitations to the extent of its power. As a con-
sequence, it is necessary for the Supreme Court to decide what matters
should be left to the states and what matters should be left to the national
government.
United States v. Lopez dealt with the Congressionally-enacted Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 (hereinafter the Act), which made it a federal of-
fense "'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the
individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."""
The defendant was first charged under a state law that outlawed guns on
school premises, but those charges were dismissed after the defendant was
charged with violating the federal Act.' The defendant challenged his con-
viction, claiming the Act exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.'29 The Government, on the other hand, argued possession of a fire-
arm near a school substantially affected interstate commerce because it could
124. Id. at 37.
125. The courts did invalidate regulations of state activities, however, as going beyond
the scope of the Commerce Clause. See generally Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (invalidating the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act because Con-
gress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to coerce states to structure tradi-
tional state operations); New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating the "take-title"
provision of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act compelling states to enact a federal regulatory
program because it was beyond the power granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause).
126. Both the Lopez and Morrison decisions were five to four. See United States v. Lo-
pez,.514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
127. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)).
128. Id at 552.
129. Id.
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result in violent crime, which would affect the functioning of the national,
economy given that the costs of violent crime would spread throughout the
nation and crime would reduce the willingness of individuals to travel to
places deemed unsafe." Moreover, the Government claimed possession of a
firearm near a school would pose a substantial threat to the educational proc-
ess by threatening the learning environment, which would lead to a less pro-
ductive citizenry, and in turn have an adverse effect on the nation's eco-
nomic well being.'
After laying out the history of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court in Lopez identified three categories of activities that Congress could
regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) Congress can regulate the use of
channels of interstate commerce, (2) Congress can regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, and (3) Congress can regulate those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. The Court rejected the Government's argu-
ments and held the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause because possession of a gun in a local school
zone is not an economic activity substantially affecting interstate com-
merce.' In addition, the Court reasoned that Congress did not have the au-
thority to enact the Gun Free School Zones Act because crime control is an
area traditionally left to the states, and Congress included no legislative find-
ings of the effect possession of guns near local schools had on interstate
commerce.1
4
For the first time in almost sixty years, the Supreme Court invalidated a
private regulation enacted by Congress as unconstitutionally surpassing its
Commerce Clause power. The Court said, "[t]o uphold the Government's
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a man-
ner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.' ' 35
Acknowledging language of prior opinions implying approval of this sort of
expansion under the Commerce Clause, the Court nevertheless held they
would not go any further because no distinction would be left between what
is truly local and what is truly national. 36
Similarly, the Controlled Substances Act 'piles inference upon infer-
ence' with regard to the impact of medical marijuana on interstate com-
merce. Congress maintains it has the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate all forms of marijuana because:
130. Id. at 564.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
133. Id. at 549.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 567.
136. Id. at 567-68
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[a] major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through in-
terstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic, which are not an
integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local
distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct ef-
fect upon interstate commerce because after manufacture, many controlled
substances are transported in interstate commerce, controlled substances
distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce
immediately before their distribution, and controlled substances possessed
commonly gow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such
possession.
This argument is flawed in several ways. Congress admits some con-
trolled substances might never travel between the states, evidenced by its use
of the words "major," "many,"i "usually," and "commonly."'38 Under the
California Compassionate Use Act, the patient or the patient's primary care-
givers are the only ones that can cultivate marijuana.'39 It does not allow im-
portation from other states, nor export to other states; persons without a pre-
scription who grow marijuana for sales or distribution will still be prose-
cuted, along with persons who smoke marijuana for recreational purposes."4°
Just as the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez attempted to punish gun
possession, the Controlled Substances Act is trying to punish possession of
certain drugs.'4' Just as the Court in Lopez deemed the Gun-Free School
Zones Act unconstitutional, it should do the same with the Controlled Sub-
stances Act because it regulates possession of marijuana, which is not an
economic activity, and as a result does not fall under Congress' commerce
power. Under Congress' Commerce Clause authority, Congress should only
be permitted to regulate controlled substances moving through interstate
lines. Congress claims activities occurring intrastate have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce because those controlled substances manufactured or
possessed in a state are sometimes transported in or to another state.'42 If so,
the federal government should have to prove the marijuana moved interstate
to prosecute under the Controlled Substances Act.'43 This would be analo-
gous to the requirement of proving that an individual crossed interstate lines
in order to prosecute that individual for kidnapping, or proving that an auto-
mobile was transported across state lines to prosecute persons for the trans-
137. 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (West 2000).
138. See Steven A. Kohnke. Can Congress Do That? An Analysis of the Federal Prohibi-
tion on Marijuana Possession, 19 Miss. C. L. REv. 381, 384 (1999).
139. See Cal. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 2000) ("Section 11358 relat-
ing to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary care-
giver, who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient
upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.").
140. See CAL. HEALTH SAFEY CODE § 11357, supra note 113, and accompanying text.
141. See Kohnke, supra note 138, at 385.
142. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (West 2000).
143. See Kohnke, supra note 138, at 387.
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porting of stolen vehicles.'" It can also be argued that it is hard to distinguish
between marijuana transported intrastate and marijuana transported inter-
state, and therefore the federal government should rightfully regulate all
marijuana. However, in light of the fact that States could have a distinguish-
able type of marijuana for medicinal purposes, i.e. a specific hybrid, this ar-
gument fails as only that hybrid would be permitted, and dispensaries could
verify the specific type when a question arose.
The Supreme Court in Lopez further stated the Controlled Substances
Act was a criminal statute having nothing to do with "commerce" and the
Act was not part of a larger regulatory scheme that would be weakened if
intrastate activity was not also regulated.45 Similarly, the Controlled Sub-
stances Act is a criminal statute and medical marijuana does not affect inter-
state commerce because the marijuana is not being purchased or transported
out of the State.
Another argument that can arise is that although the amount of mari-
juana cultivated is only for medical patients in need, it nonetheless affects
interstate commerce because of its impact on the rest of the marijuana mar-
ket. In Wickard v. Filburn,'" the defendant raised a small acreage of wheat
and sold some of it, fed his chicken and livestock, made flour, and then kept
the rest. 47 The defendant was given notice by the federal government, by
means of a statute, of how much he could harvest, but he went over the
amount allotted.'" The purpose of the federal statute regulating the amount
of harvested wheat was to control the amount of wheat moving into inter-
state commerce, thereby preventing surpluses and shortages and stabilizing
wheat prices.'49 As a result, a penalty was imposed on the defendant by the
federal regulation because his wheat crop exceeded the quota provided." He
argued the statute was unconstitutional because it only dealt with production,
something Congress could not regulate.' The Supreme Court upheld the
statute, claiming defendant's harvest competed with the national wheat mar-
ket." The Court found that under the aggregation doctrine, though one crop
alone is trivial, taken as a whole with other actors engaged in the same activ-
ity it impacts interstate commerce."3
144. See generally Hoke v. U.S., 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (holding Congress could prohibit
the transportation of women for immoral purposes); Brooks v. U.S., 267 U.S. 432 (1925)
(holding Congress could ban the interstate transportation of stolen automobiles).
145. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
146. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
147. Id. at 114.
148. Id. at 114-15.
149. Id. at 115.
150. ld. at 113.
151. Id. at 113-14.
152. Id. at 128.
153. Id. at 127-28.
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Unlike wheat, marijuana for medicinal purposes has no market to com-
pete with, as its cultivation is illegal in the United States. There are no mari-
juana farmers across the nation that will be affected, except those who ille-
gally produce the crop. Even if it is argued that the illegal market for mari-
juana needs to be regulated, allowing citizens of the state who suffer from
certain illnesses to cultivate the plant and personally use it need not conflict
with the criminal prosecution of those who persist in the illegal use of the
plant. Furthermore, the federal government has not established a quota for
the cultivation and use of medical marijuana; rather they want to prohibit all
of its production and use, even when it can significantly assist in the health
of seriously ill patients. Unlike Wickard, Congress through the Controlled
Substances Act is not making an effort to control the price of drugs; it is
merely passing a criminal law, and crime control has been traditionally left
in the hands of States. Furthermore, in Wickard, the wheat fanner was not
only using it for his own personal use, but also producing wheat to feed his
chicken and livestock, which he then sold on the market." Marijuana, how-
ever, is only being legalized for medical patients, which in no way affects
interstate commerce, just as legalizing morphine for medical patients does
not affect interstate commerce. States can regulate how much is produced
and, if it crosses state lines, the federal government can have jurisdiction
over the issue. The commerce power is not to extend,
to those [activities] which are completely within a particular State, which
do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the govern-
ment. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be consid-
ered as reserved for the State itself. 56
Marijuana for medicinal use will be cultivated within the State and used
within the State and therefore does not interfere with interstate commerce.
The Gun Free School Zones Act in Lopez could not be sustained under
the Commerce Clause because it inappropriately superseded legitimate state
laws with a new and unnecessary federal law." In the case of marijuana, the
federal law (The Controlled Substances Act) overrides a legitimate state law
that does not criminalize marijuana use by the medically ill. The states can
legitimately prosecute individuals who possess and distribute marijuana,
and, accordingly, the Controlled Substances Act is an unnecessary federal
law as to the prosecution of those individuals
In addition, the Court in Lopez held the Gun-Free School Zones Act
contained no jurisdictional element providing that firearm possession near a
school affected interstate commerce; nor did it provide any legislative find-
154. See Marcia Tiersky, Medical Marijuana: Putting the Power Where It Belongs, 93
Nw. U.L. REv. 547, 593 (1999).
155. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942).
156. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 195 (1824).
157. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995).
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ings regarding the effect of firearm possession on interstate commerce.'58
The Court said although such legislative findings were not required, such
findings would permit them to evaluate Congress' judgment that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce.'59 After Lopez was decided, the
constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act was challenged in subse-
quent cases, but the Circuit Courts held that Congress, in enacting the Act,
made specific legislative findings that local narcotics substantially affected
interstate commerce."W Regardless, the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Morrison, establishes that these legislative findings are not suffi-
cient to establish Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.
In Morrison the Court upheld the principles decided in Lopez, affirming
that the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause are not unlimited.'6'
158. Id. at 562.
159. Id. at 563.
160. See Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding Congress
made explicit findings about the effect of drugs on interstate commerce); United States v.
Puckett, et al, 147 F.3d 765, 769 n.4 (8' Cir. 1998) (holding that the statue at issue was unlike
the statute in Lopez because there were findings made about the effects on interstate com-
merce); United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding Congress made
specific findings and declarations that local narcotics activity substantially affects interstate
commerce).
The Congressional findings for the Controlled Substances Act are as follows:
The Congress makes the following findings and declarations: (1) Many of the
drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate medical purpose
and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American peo-
ple. (2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and im-
proper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the
health and general welfare of the American people. (3) A major portion of the traf-
fic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Inci-
dents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow,
such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a sub-
stantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because-(A) after manufac-
ture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, (B) con-
trolled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate
commerce immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled substances
possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such
possession. (4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contrib-
ute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. (5) Controlled substances
manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled
substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to dis-
tinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intra-
state. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled sub-
stances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
(7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
and other international conventions designed to establish effective control over in-
ternational and domestic traffic in controlled substances.
21 U.S.C. § 801 (West 2000).
161. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
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The Court also held that legislative findings of the effects on interstate
commerce are 'not sufficient to give Congress authority to regulate non-
economic activities by its Commerce Clause power." In Morrison, a
woman, after being repeatedly raped and assaulted, filed suit under a federal
statute, the Violence Against Women Act of 1994," which provided a civil
remedy for victims of gender-motivated crimes.'" The Act provided "all per-
sons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of
violence motivated by gender."'" To enforce the right,
[a] person who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall
be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensa-
tory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.'
The defendant moved to dismiss, on the grounds the statute was uncon-
stitutional, because Congress did not have authority to enact it under the
Commerce Clause.67 The United States intervened to defend the constitu-
tionality of the statute, on the grounds that the statute was a regulation of an
activity (gender motivated crimes) substantially affecting interstate com-
merce. "'8 Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in Lopez, Con-
gress supported the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act
with numerous legislative findings concerning the serious impact gender
motivated crimes had on interstate commerce."6 The legislative findings held
162. Il at 598.
163. 42 U.S.C. §13981 (West 1994).
164. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
165. Mi at 605. See also 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (West 1994).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (West 1994).
167. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
168. Id. at 603, 609.
169. Id. at 614. With respect to domestic violence, Congress received evidence for the
following findings:
'Three out of four American women will be victims of violent crimes sometime
during their life.' H.R. Rep. No. 103-395 p. 25 (1993) (citing U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29 (2d ed. 1988)). 'Vio-
lence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44.... .' S. Rep. No. 103-
138, p. 38 (1993) (citing Surgeon General Antonia Novello, From the Surgeon
General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992)). '[A]s many as 50
percent of homeless women and children are fleeing domestic violence.' S. Rep.
No. 101-545, p. 37 (1990) (citing E. Schneider, Legal Reform Efforts for Battered
Women: Past, Present, and Future (July 1990)). 'Since 1974, the assault rate
against women has outstripped the rate for men by at least twice for some age
groups and far more for others.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 30 (citing BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974) (Ta-
ble 5)). '[B]attering 'is the single largest cause of injury to women in the United
States.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37 (quoting Van Hightower & McManus, Limits
of State Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic
Violence Policies, 49 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 269 (May/June 1989)). 'An estimated 4
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gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce, "by deterring poten-
tial victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in inter-
state business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in
interstate commerce; ... by diminishing national productivity, increasing
million American women are battered each year by their husbands or partners.'
H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26 (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, American
Medical Assn., Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners,
267 JAMA 3184, 3185 (1992)). 'Over 1 million women in the United States seek
medical assistance each year for injuries sustained [from] their husbands or other
partners.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 37 (citing Stark & Flitcraft, Medical Therapy as
Repression: The Case of the Battered Woman, HEALTH & MEDICINE (Summer/Fall
1982)). 'Between 2,000 and 4,000 women die every year from [domestic] abuse.'
S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 36 (citing Schneider, supra ). '[A]rrest rates may be as low
as I for every 100 domestic assaults.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 38 (citing Dutton,
Profiling of Wife Assaulters: Preliminary Evidence for Trimodal Analysis, 3
VIOLENCE AND VicTmIs 5-30 (1988)). 'Partial estimates show that violent crime
against women costs this country at least 3 billion-not million, but billion-
dollars a year.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 33 (citing Schneider, supra, at 4).
'[E]stimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a year on health care, criminal
justice, and other social costs of domestic violence." S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 41
(citing Biden, Domestic Violence: A Crime, Not a Quarrel, TRIAL 56 (June 1993)).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631-34.
The evidence as to rape was similarly extensive, supporting these conclusions:
[The incidence of] rape rose four times as fast as the total national crime rate over
the past 10 years.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 30 (citing Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion Uniform Crime Reports (1988)). 'According to one study, close to half a mil-
lion girls now in high school will be raped before they graduate.' S. Rep. No. 101-
545, at 31 (citing R. WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 117 (1988)). '[One hun-
dred twenty-five thousand] college women can expect to be raped during this-
or any-year.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 43 (citing testimony of Dr. Mary Koss be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee, Aug. 29, 1990). '[T]hree-quarters of women
never go to the movies alone after dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50
percent do not use public transit alone after dark for the same reason.' S. Rep. No.
102-97, p. 38 (1991) (citing M. GORDON & S. RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 15
(1989)). '[Forty-one] percent of judges surveyed believed that juries give sexual
assault victims less credibility than other crime victims.' S. Rep. No. 102-197, at
47 (citing COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS, GENDER JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS 91 (1990)). 'Less than I per-
cent of all [rape] victims have collected damages.' S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 44 (cit-
ing report by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.). '[A]n individual who commits rape has
only about 4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty of any
offense.' S. Rep. No. 101-545, at 33 n.30 (quoting H. FIELD & L. BIENEN, JURORS
AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 95 (1980)). 'Almost one-quarter of
convicted rapists never go to prison and another quarter received sentences in local
jails where the average sentence is 11 months.' S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 38 (citing
Majority Staff Report of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Response to
Rape: Detours on the Road to Equal Justice, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (Comm. Print
1993)). '[A]lmost 50 percent of rape victims lose their jobs or are forced to quit
because of the crime's severity.' S. Rep. No. 102-197, at 53 (citing Ellis, Atkeson,
& Calhoun, An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCH. 3, 264 (1981)).
Id. at 633-34.
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medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for
interstate products."'70 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held the existence of
these findings was not sufficient to maintain the Violence Against Women
Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause.' "[S]imply because Con-
gress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so."'7 The Court held the legislative
findings of the affect of gender motivated crimes on interstate commerce
were weak because Congress relied on a "but-for" argument, one that is
"unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of pow-
ers."'' The Court rejected the "but-for" argument linking the initial violent
crime to the effect on interstate commerce, because they felt it would allow
Congress to regulate any crime, which would give Congress infinite
power.' Findings have to be related to a legitimate regulation, and regula-
tion of a non-commercial activity is not legitimate under the Commerce
Clause. As the United States is a system of dual-sovereignty, there must be
powers that are to be solely left in the hands of states. Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his majority opinion states:
The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local, and there is no better example of the police power,
which the Founders undeniably left reposed in the States and denied the
central government, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication
of its victims. Congress therefore may not regulate non-economic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on inter-
state commerce."
Here, the Supreme Court throws out the aggregate principle established
in Wickard76 for non-economic violent criminal conduct. The same holds
true with the case of medical marijuana. It is a non-economic activity being
regulated based on its aggregate effect on interstate commerce. Ultimately,
the Court held gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activi-
ties and thus do not fall under Congress' commerce power to regulate, as it
only has the power to regulate economic activities with a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, even if Congress provides a vast amount of legisla-
tive findings that the activity has a substantial affect on interstate com-
merce." Similarly, although the Controlled Substances Act provides legisla-
170. Id. at 634.
171. Id. at 614.
172. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557(1995) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Min. and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in
judgment).
173. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
174. Id. at 599.
175. Id.
176. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (stating that it was not the one
person that affected interstate commerce, but the collective actions that did).
177. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
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tive findings on the affect of controlled substances on interstate commerce,
the reasoning employed is merely a "but-for" argument alleging the initial
activity within the confines of a state will in turn have an effect on interstate
commerce, an argument the Supreme Court rejects.
Comparable to the case of Morrison, where the federal government can
become involved if a woman is transported across state lines and abused,'
the federal government can get involved if the marijuana crosses state lines.
However, violence occurring within the confines of a sovereign state is
strictly a matter of state jurisdiction. Therefore, medical marijuana cultivated
and used within the confines of a sovereign state should be left up to the
state to decide what actions-if any-should be taken against it. If such a
fundamental power is taken away from the states, there is no need to have a
distinction between the state and federal government.7 '
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause to pass private regula-
tions is limited, as the recent Supreme Court decisions of Lopez and Morri-
son illustrate. Congress cannot regulate non-commercial activities, even
when mass amounts of legislative findings demonstrate how the activity
does affect interstate commerce. Instead, Congress should only become in-
volved in intrastate activities through its commerce power when necessary to
regulate the use of the channels for interstate commerce, to protect the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce, and to regulate commercial activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce."
States ought to decide whether or not marijuana should be decriminal-
ized for medicinal purposes for numerous reasons. States are more than ca-
pable of regulating marijuana in their states, as they have demonstrated by
decriminalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes, and continuing to prose-
cute recreational marijuana users. Moreover, the federal system, which is
already overwhelmed with its current caseload, is being burdened further,
and the federal prosecution of persons whom the state is fully able to prose-
cute is unnecessary. Furthermore, states can act as "laboratories for experi-
mentation. '.. There is no way of knowing if allowing marijuana to be used
legally for medical purposes will work unless we allow for experimenta-
178. id. at 613 n.5.
179. "Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of tradi-
tional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities,
the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political
responsibility would become illusory." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
180. Id. at 558-59.
181. Tiersky, supra note 154, at 586 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581
(1995)) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tion. ' State legislatures are closer to the people and therefore are in a better
position to legislate for their heath, welfare, and safety.' Allowing Califor-
nia residents to decriminalize marijuana for medicinal purposes enables the
nation to see whether a policy legalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes
accomplishes something beneficial or whether it does lead to more mari-
juana being on the streets. Without attempting to implement a program, the
federal government cannot know if its marijuana policy is the best one pos-
sible for the nation as a whole. Moreover, by not experimenting, people who
are in need of the marijuana for 'heir ailments are never able to gain access
to the beneficial medication.
A federal statute criminalizing marijuana for medicinal purposes is un-
necessary, since a state can control and regulate activities occurring in their
state when the activities are completely internal and do not affect other
states. Chief Justice Marshall said, "Congress may control the State laws, so
far as it may be necessary to control them, for the regulation of com-
merce.""' Here, we are dealing with medically ill patients who will be culti-
vating marijuana in their own backyards and using it as a necessary treat-
ment for their illness. A state law, which decriminalizes marijuana for me-
dicinal purposes, needs no "control," as Justice Marshall stated so long ago,
because the cultivation and use of marijuana for terminally ill patients in a
state does not affect interstate commerce. Thus, the federal government can
prohibit marijuana from traveling to other states, but cannot restrict it from
being cultivated and used within a state, because that must be left for the
states to control as part of their police powers. Congress is attempting to use
the Commerce Clause to bring the issue into federal jurisdiction, when it has
no place there and when the Commerce Clause never intended such.
Alreen Hussein*
182. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. See Tiersky, supra note 154, at 586.
184. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, at 206 (1824).
. J.D. candidate, April, 2002. Many thanks to Professors Laurence Benner, Michael
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